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P. RUDD and GLADYS M. RUDD, his wife, I 
Plaintiffs and Respondents I 
— vs. — 1 
J. B. and R. E. WALKER, INC., a corporation, I 
Defendant and Appellant I 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents Rudds 
With the permission of the Court the respondents' 
brief will be divided into two parts to meet the two main 
divisions of appellant's brief. This brief will consider 
the right-of-way portions of the appeal. Substantially the 
only difference as to the facts is that which would seem 
to be more logically considered in connection with the 
matter of waiver and is set forth, beginning of page 16. 
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Most of appellant's brief is devoted to a claim of error 
because the court: 
1. Eef used to strike all evidence relating to a right-
of-way. 
2. Overruled appellant's objections to the admission 
of evidence concerning the same. 
3. Made a finding that a right-of-way by necessity 
existed and 
4. Eequired the defendant to provide access to 
Rudd's property. 
The basis of the objections is that the litigating of a 
right of way was not within the pleadings and the intro-
duction of the evidence concerning it was objected to 
throughout the trial. For instance at the top of page 37 
of the appellant's brief is found the statement: 
"During the entire course of the trial the de-
fendant objected to the admission of evidence of 
this nature." 
Neither of these contentions are correct 
Before answering the brief of the Defendant and 
Appellant it might be well to first consider the purpose 
of the complaint. 
THIS IS A PROCEEDING TO ENJOIN EXISTING 
NUISANCE AND FOR DAMAGES CAUSED THEREBY 
In general, the nuisances complained of are: 
1. Poluting the air with dust, 
2. Disturbing the peace with sounds and lights, and 
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3. Obstructing the means of ingress and egress 
or right of way. 
This brief will be devoted to the consideration of the 
objections relating to the last of these three, the nuisance 
arising from obstructing the right of way. 
OBSTRUCTION OF A WAY IS A NUISANCE 
In Salter v. Taylor, 55 Ga. 310 a private way was 
blocked by the erection of a fence across it. This action 
was brought to abate the barrier as a nuisance. The judg-
ment abating the nuisance was affirmed. In doing so, 
the court said: 
"1 . Was the fence a private nuisance? Black-
stone says: ' A nuisance signifies anything that 
worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage.' And 
again he says: 'If I have a way annexed to my 
estate, across another's land and he obstructs me 
in the use of it, either by stopping it, or putting 
logs across it, or plowing over it, it is a nuisance.' 
Chitty's Blackstone, 3rd Book 215, 218. This fence 
then was a nuisance." 
In Frick v. Kansas City et al., 93 S.W. 351, 117 Mo. 
A 488, a sewer contractor piled surplus dirt on a vacant 
lot adjoining that owned by the Plaintiff and did not re-
move it promptly, thus barring access to Plaintiff's prop-
erty. There the court said: 
"The formation and maintenance of these 
embankments, as detailed, constituted a private 
nuisance . . .and the defendants are liable to the 
plaintiff for her damages, that directly resulted 
from such nuisance." (Emphasis added.) 
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In Cadigan v. Brown, 120 Mass. 493, it is said : 
"This is a bill in equity alleging that each of 
the plaintiffs is the owner of a lot of land abutting 
on a passageway five feet wide, and, as appurten-
ant thereto, has a right of way over said passage-
way in common with others; that the defendants 
have commenced to build a house at one end of the 
passage-way, so as to narrow the width of the 
entrance to about four feet, and have raised the 
grade and filled up a part of the passage-way so as 
to injure the access to the lots of the plaintiffs. 
The prayer is that the defendant be restrained 
from building the house, that the said obstruc-
tions may be removed and for general relief. The 
defendants demur, upon the grounds that the 
plaintiffs are improperly joined, and that they do 
not state a case which entitles them to relief in 
equity . . . This is a private nuisance, which 
entitles the plaintiffs to relief in equity . . . " 
In Schaidt v. Blaul, 6 Atl. 669, 66 Md. 141, an alley-
way afforded the only access to a creek from which plain-
tiff in the winter obtained ice for his butchering. This 
was obstructed. 
"In the language of the authorities, this ob-
struction 'reaches to the very substance and value 
of the estate, and goes to the destruction of it in 
the character in which it is enjoyed/ I t has been 
long settled that such a wrongful act will be en-
joined in equity." 
In Holmes v. Jones, 7 S.E. 168, 80 Ga. 659, where a 
way of necessity was obstructed it was held that such 
was a nuisance and it was abated. 
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In Dries v. City of St. Jospeh, 73 S.W. 723, 98 Mo. 
A. 611, the city blocked one end of a private alley. This 
was held to be actionable. 
Mr. Wood has this to say on the subject: 
"It may be stated, generally, that any inter-
ference with a private way, by the landowner or 
any other person, that materially interferes with 
its convenient use, or by the owner of the right of 
way is a nuisance, to recover the damages for 
which an action on the case will lie." Wood on the 
Law of Nuisance, section 170. (Emphasis added.) 
In Donovan v. Pennsylvania, Co., 199 U.S. 279, 50 
L. Ed. 192, 26 S. Ct. 91, the railroad brought the action 
to enjoin the competing cab drivers from invading the 
station to solicit patronage and from congregating on 
the sidewalk so as to interfere with ingress and egress 
to and from the station. The court held that the railroad 
was entitled to the injunction sought and quoted with 
approval and, through Mr. Justice Harlan, in part, said 
(199 IT. S. 279, 302; 50 L. Ed. 192, 202 26 S. Ct. 91): 
"The general doctrine is correctly stated in 
Dillon on Municipal Coporations: 'For example, 
an abutting owner's right of access to and from the 
street, subject only to legitimate public regula-
tion, is as much his property as his right to the 
soil within his boundary lines , . . When he is de-
prived of such right of access, or of any other 
easement connected with the use and enjoyment 
of his property, other than by the exercise of 
legitimate public regulation, he is deprived of 
his property/ " 
In Garitee v. Mayor et al., 53 Md. 422, where the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
plaintiff had a wharf which became useless by the defen-
dants' acts in dredging and dumping the waste near the 
wharf, it was held to be an interference with a means 
of access and a nuisance. 
In Strong v. Sullivan, 181 P. 59, 180 Cal. 331, where 
a restaurant owner complained of the parking of a 
portable lunch stand near the entrance to his restaurant 
thus interferring with the right of access, it was held 
to a nuisance. 
In Barber v. Penley, L.K., 2 Ch. Div. 447 (1893) 
where "Charley's Aunt" was attracting such crowds to 
the Globe Theatre as to block ready access to plain-
tiff's premises it was held to be a nuisance. 
A similar blocking of the access to property by 
crowds waiting for service, with a like declaration of 
the law is found in Shamhart v. Morrison Cafeteria, 
32 S. 2d 727,159 Fla. 629. 
To the same effect see: 
Smith v. Mitchell, 58 P. 667, 21 Wash. 536; 
Merchants Mutual Telephone Co. v. Hirsch-
man, 87 N.E. 238, 43 Ind. A. 283; 
Harman v. Louisville, U. 0. & T. R. Co., 11 
S.W. 703, 87 Term. 614; 
Fritz v. Hobson, L.R., 14 Ch. Div. 542; 
Fitzgerald v. Smith, 271 P. 507, 94 Cal. A. 
480; 
Lane v. San Diego Electric Ey., 280 P. 109, 
208 Cal. 29; 
Cassel v. City of New York, 153 NYS 410; 
George Washington Inn v. Consolidated Ma-
chinery, 75 F 2d 657; 
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Lowell v. Pendleton Auto Co., 261 P. 415? 
123 Ore. 383; 
Wissler v. Hershey, 23 Pa. St. 333; 
66CJS780; 46 CJ 689. 
THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR NUISANCE 
It is there alleged (R. 1) that the defendant is operat-
ing a sand and gravel processing plant near the homes 
of the plaintiffs; that in the course of the operation heavy 
machinery is operated; that in the operation of such 
machinery and the maintenance of huge stock piles of 
sand and dirt that great quantities of dust arise in the 
air and are carried to and deposited on the plaintiffs' 
property and food; that in the operation and repair of 
the equipment loud noises and flashing lights are emit-
ted so as to interfere with normal conversation and 
sleep of plaintiffs; that the defendant has dug away the 
roads and placed huge stockpiles of sand and gravel so 
as to obstruct and block the roads, rights of way and 
means of ingress and egress; that these matters consti-
tute a nuisance and ruin the value and enjoyment of 
plaintiffs' adjacent property. In the prayer it is sought 
to enjoin continuance of the nuisance and for damages. 
It is not, and can not be, contended that the complaint 
does not state a cause of action. 
Inasmuch as the complaint does state a cause of 
action resulting from the creation and operation of a 
nuisance, that would dispose of all of the matters raised 
by appellant under Point I. 
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Without waiving this disposition of appellant's first 
point, for the sake of discussion, let us see if appellant 
did not waive all rights to now object. 
IN THE COMPLAINT THE PLAINTIFFS CLAIM 
AN OBSTRUCTION OF A RIGHT-OF-WAY 
In the complaint it is alleged in part: 
"6. That in the operation of said gravel 
plant aforesaid, defendant . . . moves great great 
quantities of dirt . . . and by . . . the stockpiling 
of the resulting sand and gravel, the roads, lanes, 
and creek located on the lands of the plaintiffs and 
in the vicinity thereof, have become obstructed." 
(K. 2) 
"7. That in the operation of the said gravel 
plant aforesaid defendant has . . . changed the 
terrain from its original state, has dug away the 
roads and placed huge stock piles of sand and 
gravel, so that defendant has blocked and made 
parts of plaintiffs' property inaccessible by ob-
structing rights of way, paths and other means of 
ingress and egress to the property of the plain-
tiffs . . ." 
Again in the last sentence of Paragraph 8 of the 
complaint it is alleged, in part: 
"8 . . . That the operation of said gravel pit 
and processing plant, as aforesaid,... i s . . . an ob-
struction to the free use and access to their prop-
erty . . . " 
The prayer also relates to the matter as follows: 
"Wherefore, plaintiffs pray . . . that the de-
fendant be required and ordered by the court to 
restore all rights of way, paths and other means 
of ingress and egress to their premises. . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In the foregoing, complaint is made of the blocking 
and destruction of roads, lanes, rights of way, paths, 
access and other means of ingress and egress to and from 
the property of the plaintiffs. Nothing could be broader 
than these allegations. There is no restriction of the 
complaint to public roads, or to private roads, lanes or 
rights of way granted by deed or otherwise. It includes 
public roads, private roads, lanes, rights of way of all 
types, and all "other means of access," "ingress and 
egress." 
As pointed out above, this action was for the remedy 
afforded for a nuisance. The nuisance consisted of posi-
tion of the air w i^th dust, disturbing the peace with irri-
tating sounds and lights and the interference with the 
right of access, all caused by the way the defendant oper-
ated its gravel and crushing plant. The rights infringed 
were several but they all resulted from the operation of 
the plant. The flashes of light made in welding were 
caused by a different operation than the sounds caused 
by hammering off the "beads" following the welding. 
These sounds were caused by a different operation than 
those which resulted from the giant crushers breaking 
large boulders. And while some dust came from that 
same crushing, much of it came from the dropping of the 
earth before and after the crushing and from the build-
ing and maintaining of the huge stock piles. These stock 
piles were also the obstructions across the means of 
access. The whole thing was one integrated operation 
of which the obstruction was a part and the pollution of 
the air and the disturbance of the peace were also a 
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part. It wTas so alleged and the issue tendered to the 
defendant. 
Whether defendant could have required a separate 
and previous trial of the issue of the ownership of a right 
of way is not an issue here because, 
NO STEPS WERE TAKEN TO REQUIRE A MORE 
DETAILED STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE OF A 
RIGHT OF WAY 
The defendant filed (E. 9) a general and a special 
demurrer based on misjoinder of parties and of causes 
and the failure to separately state and on the uncertainty 
as to the amount of damages suffered by each plaintiff. 
But in these general statements no objection was made 
as to the sufficiency of the allegations concerning the 
nuisance arising from interference with our right of way. 
Nor was it urged in the demurrer nor in the argument 
thereon that the cause of action on the nuisance arising 
from obstructing the ways and means of access should 
be separately stated nor applified by stating the kind of 
a right of way claimed nor the source of the same. 
A motion to make more definite and certain was also 
filed (E. 11) but in its two pages and six paragraphs 
the only enlightenment desired on rights of way is found 
in paragraph 4 where defendant seeks to require plain-
tiffs to set forth "the exact location of the rights of way, 
paths and other means of ingress and egress . . ." No-
where is there a suggestion that defendant needed more 
information as to what rights of way plaintiffs claimed 
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nor as to what rights might be referred to as "other 
means of ingress and egress" nor as to the source of the 
same. 
This was a proceeding for an injunction to abate a 
nuisance and to recover damages suffered. The demur-
rer was properly overruled because a nuisance, involving 
the blocking of means of access and other invasions of 
rights, was sufficiently alleged. 
The appellant seeks comfort from the answers to 
the interrogatories. They are as barren of help for the 
appellant as the complaint is. The interrogatory in ques-
tion (K. 23) was this: 
"4. Will the plaintiffs set forth the exact lo-
cation of the rights of way, paths and other means 
of ingress and egress to the property of plaintiffs 
which they allege in Paragraph 7 of their said 
complaint to have been obstructed and blocked by 
defendant's action V 
To this the plaintiffs Budd answered (and their an-
swer was adopted by plaintiffs Pedler (E. 28) as follows: 
"4. Answering the fourth interrogatory, the 
plaintiff states that the exact location of the said 
right of way cannot be accurately stated because 
the ground over which it passed has been exca-
vated but that the said right of way passed from 
the southerly end of the old mill property in a 
southeasterly direction until it joined with the 
part of the road which still remains and such right 
of way was northwesterly from this plaintiff's 
property, and that said right of way at all times 
was easterly and northerly from the Big Cotton-
wood Creek and ran somewhat parallel to the 
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same although at varying distances to the east-
ward and northward from the said Creek." 
The question is directed, not to whether the way 
claimed is public or private, an easement granted by 
deed, one obtained by prescription or by necessity, but 
merely to where it was located. The answer therefore 
covers that point only, setting forth its location. There 
is no help here for the claim of the appellant that the 
litigation related to public roads only. 
Furthermore the interrogatories themselves reveal 
the broad issue of "ways' claimed by the plaintiffs. No-
tice the breadth of defendant's (appellant's) inquiry: 
"4. Will the plaintiffs set forth the exact 
location of the right-of-way, paths and other 
means of ingress and egress to the property of 
plaintiffs..." 
The inquiry is not of roads or highways but of 
"rights-of-way, paths and other means of ingress and 
egress." Certainly these included rights of way by neces-
sity. 
"A right of way can be created by grant, 
either express or implied. . . There are two kinds 
of implied grants of rights of way: (1) Ways 
by necessity, and (2) Ways by prescription." 17 
Am. Jur. p. 936. 
"This incorporeal heriditament is a right of 
private passage over another's land. I t may arise 
either by grant of the owner of the soil, or by 
prescription which supposes a grant, or from 
necessity." 3 Kent Commentaries (13 Ed.) 581 
(star page 419). 
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Not only was the appellant's inquiry of rights-of-
way but also of "other means of ingress and egress" in 
accordance with the allegations Paragraph 7 of the com-
plaint. Clearly the easement by necessity was one of 
the matters alleged in the complaint and observed by the 
respondent. 
To say that the only way referred to in the complaint 
or interrogatories was a public one is to ignore the ob-
vious. No broader allegations, as to the rights which were 
invaded, could be made in the complaint than: 
"7. . . . that defendant has blocked and made 
parts of plaintiffs' property inaccessible by ob-
structing rights-of-way, paths and other means of 
ingress and egress to plaintiffs' property." (E. 3) 
The "roads, lanes, rights-of-way, paths and other 
means of ingress and egress" are as broad as it is possible 
to make them. 
The issue of the obstruction of these roads, rights-
of-way and other means of access were clearly and un-
mistakably raised by the complaint. 
Now what does the answer do on this subject? It 
merely denies the obstruction of the rights of way, roads, 
and other means of access in a general denial of all the 
acts of trespass alleged. See paragraphs 6, 7, & 8. (R. 21) 
Clearly the issue made by the pleadings, or the plead-
ings and the interrogatories, is whether defendant did 
deny access to plaintiffs' property and not whether 
plaintiffs had a right of access. If the issue of right of 
access was as important to defendant then as it became 
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on the sixth day of trial and as is now urged, the defend-
ant had ample opportunity to raise that issue. However 
in the demurrer, motion to make more certain, interroga-
tories and answer the defendant failed to question where-
in the right of access arose but contented itself with deny-
ing that its acts in preventing access constituted a nuis-
ance. 
AT PRE-TRIAL NO ISSUE OF THE RIGHT OF 
ACCESS WAS RAISED 
The issue which the court found from the pleadings 
was (R. 30): 
". . . whether the operations of the defendant 
constitute or result in a nuisance . . . " 
This was stipulated by the parties as the issue to 
be tried. (R. 31) 
Again the defendant waived any issue as to plaintiffs' 
authority to use the right-of-way and contented itself 
with taking the negative of the issue, that its operations 
in blocking and interferring with the "rights-of-way" 
and "other means of ingress and egress" constituted a 
nuisance. That was the dispute between the parties and 
so it remained up until the sixth day of trial. There was 
no dispute as to whether plaintiffs had a right-of-way, 
by necessity or grant, in company with all the public 
or otherwise, but only as to whether defendant interfer-
e d with the passage and whether that constituted a nuis-
ance. 
It is submitted that the time to frame the issues so as 
to require Plaintiffs to specify whether the right they 
claimed was a private right and whether it has held by 
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prescription or necessity, had passed without defendant 
raising the question. This would also seem to dispose 
of appellant's Point I, but there is still a further w^aiver 
by defendant. 
ALL OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL OF THE ISSUE 
OF A RIGHT-OF-WAY WAS WAIVED 
This was done by permitting the introduction of 
evidence on the matter without objection. 
This is governed by Eule 15 (b) of the Utah Eules of 
Civil Procedure which reads as follows: 
"(b) AMENDMENTS TO CONFOEM TO 
THE EVIDENCE. When issues not raised by 
the pleadings are tried by express or implied con-
sent of the parties, they shall be treated in all re-
spects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be neces-
sary to cause them to conform to the evidence and 
to raise these issues may be made upon motion of 
any party at any time, even after judgment; but 
failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to 
at the trial on the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow 
the pleadings to be amended when the presenta-
tion of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense 
upon the merits. The court shall grant a continu-
ance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party 
to meet such evidence." (Emphasis added.) 
Concerning similar rule in the Federal practice it 
is said in Moore Federal Practice: 
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"At the trial, Eule 15 enables the case to be 
litigated on the merits. It does this in two ways: 
(a) in effect pleadings are automatically amended 
to conform to proof on issues tried by express 
or implied consent.9 . . . The sporting element in 
litigation is eliminated." 
And in note 9, referred to in the text, we read: 
"9. This is true because Kule 15 (b) pro-
vides : 'Such amendment of the pleadings as may 
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evi-
dence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judg-
ment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues.' " (3 Moore Fed-
eral Practice (Kev. Ed.) p. 805, sec. 15.02) ' 
Now did defendant impliedly consent to the trial 
of the issue of a road, right-of-way or other means of 
ingress and egress? Defendant maintains in his brief 
that it did not impliedly consent but objected throughout 
the trial. The transcript does not bear out this assertion. 
The following evidence on the subject of roads, rights-of-
way and other means of access was introduced without 
objection: 
(E. 209, line 10) (By Mr. J. Eichard Mulliner.) 
"Q. Now Mr. Draper, you have lived around this 
place since—been acquainted with it since 
about 1929. Is that your testimony here? 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. Now are you acquainted — I will ask you if 
in 1929 you know by what means of access, 
what the means of access was to — egress 
to and access from the home, to and from the 
home, which is now the Pedler home? 
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A. The only way they could get into their home 
wras entering in from the highway at the Old 
Mill Club property and then traveling to the 
south and east along toward the Old Mill 
Club Eeservoir and entering through a gate 
there into the Pedler home. 
Q. Would you describe this roadway if you will? 
A. This roadway was a well defined roadway 
properly kept up because it wras the only 
means of getting into the Pedler property. 
Q. Do you have any present recollection of this 
roadway in 1929 ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that, what facts bring that to your 
mind at the present time? 
A. I worked for the Old Mill Club at that time, 
and one of our duties was to keep the leaves 
and shrubs out of the springs that furnish 
the water to the Old Mill Club, and I would 
go up there at least two or three times a week 
in the performance of that duty. 
Q. In 1929 wras this roadway kept up? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And for how long was this road open if you 
recall? 
A. Well, I remember this road there in 1926. My 
wife and I used to drive up to that spring on 
our week-end days and get water cress out 
of that spring. 
Q. And in 1926 was there a well defined road-
way? 
A. Yes, the only difference was then there was a 
bridge across the Old Mill Club race and that 
was in rather bad shape, but I think that was 
fixed up in the spring of 1929. 
GENERAL RITER: Mr. Mulliner, will you 
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invite my attention to the allegations concerning 
this roadway in your complaint? 
ME. J. EICHAED MULLINEE: Yes, sir. 
Your interrogatories direct— 
THE COURT: I didn't get that last date. 
(The last answer was read by the Eeporter.) 
ME. J. EICHAED MULLINEE: With ref-
erence to the rights of ingress and egress. 
THE COUET: You are reading from the 
interrogatories. 
GENEEAL EITEE: I don't believe those 
interrogatories raise the issues. 
ME. J. EICHAED MULLINEE: I just 
want to show it is in the complaint some place. 
GENEEAL EITEE: I want you to point out 
to me where that allegation is that you are direct-
ing your interrogation. 
ME. J. EICHAED MULLINEE: Paragraph 
seven about changing the terrain from its original 
state. 
(Mr. Mulliner read Paragraph seven in the 
complaint.) 
GENEEAL EITEE: Thank you very much. 
Q. (By Mr. J. Eichard Mulliner) Is that road 
way in existence at the present time, Mr. 
Draper? 
A. Well, the gravel fill is used there up as far as 
the stock piles. 
Q. By gravel fill do you mean J. B. and E. E. 
Walker, Incorporated? 
A. Yes, but from there on it is obstructed. 
Q. And how is it obstructed? 
A. Well, these stock piles obstruct it in the be-
ginning. 
GENEEAL EITEE: Now if the Court please, 
I wanted this interrogation to get along that far 
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to give me a chance to make my record and object. 
There is no evidence to show that Pedler or any 
of the plaintiffs had any right to use that roadway. 
THE COURT: There is no evidence show-
ing that there is a right-of-way. 
GENERAL RITER: No evidence showing 
there is a right-of-way. 
THE COURT: The Court will grant that. 
GENERAL RITER: I move to strike this 
entire evidence at this time because there must be 
evidence to show their right to use it, and the 
records, as they now stand, show there has been 
no right, no title. 
MR, J. RICHARD MULLINER: I expect to 
tie that up, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The motion will be taken un-
der advisement. The Court will determine whether 
or not there is any evidence on the subject before 
ruling on it. 
Q. (By J. Richard Mulliner) I show you the 
third picture in Plaintiffs' Exhibit RR and 
will ask you if any part of that right-of-way 
is visible on that photograph? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you indicate where with relation to ob-
jects on that photograph the right-of-way of 
this roadway was ? 
A. That entered just to the right of the stop sign 
and went up through where you see the dust. 
Q. That was the original roadway proceeding 
there in 1926, was it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And has it existed to your own knowledge 
ever since 1926? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, if you will state, Mr. Draper,— 
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GENEEAL EITEE: Can I look at that a 
minute, please? 
THE COUET: You didn't show the nature 
of these obstacles. 
ME. J. EICHAED MULLINEE: I was just 
getting to that. 
Q. (By Mr. J. Eichard Mulliner) Now would 
you state again what are the nature of the 
obstacles to this roadway there at the present 
time? 
A. Well, the stock piles obstruct the road where 
it existed, and then just as you get to the 
northwest corner of the Pedler property there 
has been a ditch dug through there and large 
boulders at that point making it inaccessible 
to the Eudd's property. 
Q. Is it possible now to drive on this real old 
road, from the Old Mill, where this old road 
used to take off the Cottonwood Highway to 
the Pedler property or to properties east of 
there? 
A. No. 
Q. The sand piles that you spoke of are the sand 
piles at the end of the conveyor belt that ap-
pear on Exhibit I? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they are built over this roadway? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know when it was first obstructed? 
A. As near as I can remember it was the summer 
of '46. 
GENEEAL EITEE: If the Court please, so 
that I won't keep irritating everybody my objec-
tion, of course, runs to this entire line of testimony 
and may the record so show. 
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THE COURT: As to the obstacle of this 
roadway to the Pedler property? 
GENERAL RITER: As to the testimony 
pertaining to this road. 
THE COURT: It may show that. The objec-
tion is overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mnlliner) Is it possible 
at the present time for a vehicle to proceed 
from the turn off point down by the Old Mill 
on the Cottonwood Highway up through the 
Walker Plant to the Pedler and Dunn homes, 
Rudd homes I should say? 
A. It would depend on how far they went. It 
might be possible to get a car in there, but the 
road as it existed is plugged up. 
THE COURT: By that you mean they may 
drive in there but not on the old road. By that you 
mean they might, they could get a car into the 
Pedler property of the Old Mill, but not on the 
old road! 
THE WITNESS: No, it would be possible to 
get a car in, but they wouldn't get a car in like 
they did. 
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mnlliner) Is there any 
defined road at all there you could see? 
A. After you leave the corner of the Pedler prop-
erty where it is plugged off, you can see the 
road from there, leading on from there, to the 
Rudd property, and also you can see it from 
the Old Mill entrance up to the stock piles. 
Q. By that you mean you can see road from 
Pedler's property east to the Old— 
A. Yes. 
Q. And from the Old Mill up to the stock pile. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is there any right-of-way or anything discern-
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able over the Walker property, the lower 
plant property itself to the stock pile ? 
A. No, they might swerve around there in some 
manner, but as far as the road is concerned 
it is blocked off." 
It is to be noted that the testimony that this road 
was the only way they could get into their property (K. 
209, line 18) was introduced without objection. It was 
further testified that the road was well defined and had 
in existence in 1926. It was at this point that the appel-
lant inquired as to where the allegations in the complaint 
as to the roadway were to be found and that when para-
graph 7 was pointed out, counsel for Appellant still made 
no objection (E. 211, line 4) and it was not until further 
evidence was introduced as to the obstruction of the right 
of way that an objection was made. Certainly it can't 
be claimed that this evidence concerning the road, its 
antiquity, location, appearance and obstruction which 
was testified to, was introduced over the objection of the 
appellant. There was no objection at all until appellant 
protested as follows: 
"GENERAL RITEE: Now if the Court 
please, I wanted this interrogation to get along 
that far to give me a chance to make my record 
and object. There is no evidence here to show 
that Pedler or any of the plaintiffs had any right 
to use that roadway. 
THE COURT: There is no evidence showing 
there is a right-of-way. 
GENEEAL EITEE: No evidence showing 
there is a right-of-way." (E. 211, line 13). 
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And even when an objection was raised as to the 
testimony, it was not that the evidence was outside of 
the issues but rather that there was at that time no evi-
dence that the plaintiffs had a right to use that roadway 
or that a right-of-way existed. But there was no objection 
to the litigation of that issue. 
Later (R. 213, line 9) appellant stated that the "ob-
jection, of course, runs to this entire line of testimony" 
and again (R. 213, line 14) "As to the testimony pertain-
ing to this road." But the objection which it is sought 
to have run to all subsequent questions is not as to 
whether the pleadings were broad enough to support the 
issue of a right-of-way or road or access over this prop-
erty used by the appellant. The objection adopted was 
merely that (R. 211, line 15) "There is no evidence here 
to show that . . . the plaintiffs had a right to use that 
roadway . . . (R. 211, line 19) no evidence showing there 
is a right of way." (It is to be noted that in appellant's 
brief no effort is made to rest on this premature objec-
tion, that there was no evidence of a right-of-way nor that 
plaintiffs had a right to use it.) 
Later further evidence of the road, right-of-way, or 
means of access was introduced without objection. On the 
third day of trial Mr. Reinsimar testified that he re-
membered the road in 1912 (R. 342, line 16); and that 
it ran up to Rudds (R. 342, line 20); that it was an old 
road then (R. 342, line 27) and he further described it (R. 
343). Still there was no objection that the nuisance result-
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ing from obstruction of the right of way, was not within 
the issues. 
Mr. J. B. Dunn testified he remembered the road be-
tween the Old Mill and Rudds as far back as 1929 (R. 
372). He was cross examined concering its location (R. 
375). 
Mr. Henry Butler testified on the fourth day of the 
trial, without objection, that he remembered the road 
as far back as 1918 (R. 520 and 521) and that it went up 
to the Rudd cabin from the parking lot at the Old Mill. 
On the same day the following remarks were made 
(R.572,line23): 
"GENERAL RITER: What are your con-
tentions? 
MR CLAWSON: That we have a way of nec-
essity; we have a way on prescriptive right, and 
possibly it is a public road under County ordi-
nances. 
GENERAL RITER: You haven't plead the 
County ordinances. 
MR. CLAWSON: We may have to." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Here, clearly, was the contention made that the way 
might be claimed as one of necessity. Yet there was no 
objection that such a way was not within the issues. 
Charles Rudd testified one couldn't get into his 
cabin, except over this road (R. 580, line 24) but there 
was still no objection. 
Glen Rudd testified that the road ran from the Old 
Mill to the Rudd property and that there was no other 
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way of getting in (R. 584) and that it was an old road 
when he remembered it first (R. 585). 
It was not until after all of this testimony was re-
ceived, and on the sixth day of trial, November 1, 1950, 
that the first objection was made wherein it was claimed 
that the right-of-way was not within the issues (R. 651, 
line 14). 
So we submit that appellant did not object to the trial 
of the issue of roads, rights-of-way and means of access 
but contented itself by merely objecting (R. 209, line 10 
et seq.), after the ground had been substantially covered 
without objecting; that respondent had not, up to that 
time, shown a right to use this road or that there was a 
right-of-way (R. 211). 
Under Rule 15b of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the enlarging of the issues is permitted. If such action 
prejudiced the appellant, a continuance would have been 
granted. No continuance was sought. And the trial lasted 
from October 23rd to November 29th with numerous 
interruptions in the five week interval. Appellants can't 
say they have been prejudiced. This is merely a point 
made on appeal, one which was not of sufficient import-
ance to raise before or during the trial of this case. 
Point No. 2 (found on page 54 of Appellant's brief, 
raises the question of the adjudication of the question 
of a right of way without the presence of one of the prin-
cipal stockholders of appellant (paragraph 3 of Ex. 
UUU) and the wife of the president of the appellant. This 
is merely another way of saying that a non joinder is 
claimed. 
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NON JOINDER IS WAIVED BY FAILING TO RAISE 
THE POINT UNLESS THE PARTY IS INDISPENSABLE 
THE OWNER WAS NOT INDISPENSABLE. 
In the case of In Be Thompson's Estate, 269 P. 103,. 
108; 72 Utah 17, this court (Justice Straup speaking) 
said: 
"The assignment that the widow ought to 
have been made a party is overruled. Under our 
Code, defect of parties is something to be taken 
advantage of by special demurrer or by answer. 
The special demurrers were on grounds of ambig-
uity and uncertainty, and not on grounds of de-
fect or want of parties. Nor was the matter raised 
by answer. Unless raised by demurrer or by 
answer, the defect was waived. Nor do we see 
wherein the widowT was a proper, much less a nec-
essary or indispensable party." 
And in Buliler v. Maddison, 166 P. 2d 205, 212; 109 Utah 
245, this court said: 
"Lastly, we consider appellant's special de-
murrer for defect of parties defendant. This ob-
jection must fall on two grounds, firstly as not 
being properly raised, and secondly as not being 
timely presented to the court. It is said in 39 A. 
Jr. 110: 
" 'Under the common-law practice, and in jur-
isdictions in which the practice is still funda-
mentally according to the common law, an objec-
tion to the non-joinder of parties can, as a general 
rule, be taken advantage of only by a plea in abate-
ment, or by a plea or answer in the nature thereof, 
although there is authority to the effect that at 
common law if the defect appears on the face of 
the pleading objection may be taken advantage 
of by demurrer or in arrest of judgment.' " 
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Again this respondent refers the Court to the Utah Kules 
of Civil Procedure (19b) which provide: 
"(b) EFFECT OF FAILUEE TO JOIN. 
When parties who are not indispensable, but who 
ought to be parties if complete relief is to be ac-
corded between those already parties, have not 
been made parties and are subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the court as to service of process, the court 
shall order them summoned to appear in the ac-
tion. The court in its discretion may proceed in 
the action without making such persons parties, 
if its jurisdiction over them can be acquired only 
by their consent or voluntary appearance; but the 
judgment rendered therein does not effect the 
rights or liabilities of absent persons." 
It will be noted that there is no evidence that Mary 
Golf Walker is a resident of Utah or that she was, be-
tween the time of the commencement of this suit and the 
judgment, in the State of Utah and hence that she was 
subject to the jurisdiction of this court. This would seem 
to dispose of the point unless she was an indispensable 
party. Inasmuch as we are following Federal Kules a 
case from the Supreme Court of the United States should 
be helpful on this matter of who are indispensable par-
ties. Mr. Justice Curtis spoke for that court in the case 
of Shields v. Barrows (17 How. 130, 136; 15 L. Ed. 158, 
160): 
"The court here points out three classes of 
parties to a bill in equity. They are: 1. Formal 
parties. 2. Persons having an interest in the con-
troversy, and who ought to be made parties, in 
order that the court may act on that rule which re-
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quires it to decide on, and finally determine the 
entire controversy, and do complete justice, by 
adjusting all the rights involved in it. These per-
sons are commonly termed necessary parties; but 
if their interests are separable from those of the 
parties before the court so that the court can pro-
ceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, 
without affecting other persons, not before the 
court, the latter are not indispensable parties. 
3. Persons who not only have an interest in the 
controversy, but an interest of such a nature that 
a final decree cannot be made without either af-
fecting that interest, or leaving the controversy 
in such a condition that its final termination may 
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good con-
science." 
The California case of McKelvey v. Eodriguez, 134 
P. 2d 870, 874; 57 Cal. A. 2d 214, is in point. There an 
action in ejectment or payment of the purchase price 
was begun by the executor of the deceased seller of real 
estate against the heir, in possession, of the deceased 
buyer. No attempt was made to bring in the other heirs 
of the buyer and the heir sued raised a defense of non 
joinder. Judgment for the Plaintiff resulted in this ap-
peal. In affirming the decree the court discussed the 
non joinder and said: 
"The adjudication in the present case was not 
in effect an adjudication that the contract was in 
default for failure of the purchaser or her succes-
sors to perform the terms thereof, but was merely 
an adjudication of appellants' default in refusing 
to pay the balance claimed to be due, upon demand 
therefor. The other heirs and successors are not 
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precluded thereby from taking advantage of any 
waiver of performance of the terms of the con-
tract. It is thus demonstrated that the interest 
of appellants is separable in this respect from that 
of the other heirs. * * * The entire controversy 
existing between respondents and the heirs at law 
of Merced Castaneda is not settled by the suit in 
ejectment against appellants. It has merely been 
determined that if appellants desire to occupy 
and enjoy the premises they must pay the balance 
due on the purchase thereof. The status of the 
contract and any waiver of strict performance of 
its terms, with relation to the other heirs, remains 
undetermined and unaffected by the judgment in 
the present action." 
In another case (Bank of California v. Superior 
Court, 106 P. 2d 879, 16 Cal. 2d 516) an action was 
brought upon a promise made to plaintiff by a decedent 
to leave all the latter's property to the promisee. The ac-
tion was brought to enforce the agreement, All of the 
heirs were made parties but only part were served. A 
motion was made to require the service of summons on 
the other heirs and, upon an adverse ruling this action 
for a writ of prohibition was sought. In denying the 
writ of the court (106 P. 2d at 883) discussed "necessary" 
and "indispensable" parties and said: 
"These two terms have frequently been 
coupled together as if they have the same mean-
ing; but there appears to be a sound distinction, 
both in theory and practice, between parties 
deemed 'indispensable' and those considered mere-
ly 'necessary.' As Professor Clark has remarked: 
'It has been objected that the terms 'necessary' 
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and 'indispensable' convey the same idea * * * 
But a distinction has been drawn. While necessary 
parties are so interested in the controversy that 
they should normally be made parties in order to 
enable the court to do complete justice, yet if their 
interests are separable from the rest and particu-
larly wiiere their presence in the suit cannot be 
obtained, they are not indispensable parties. The 
latter are those without whom the court cannot 
proceed.' Clark Code Pleading, p. 245, note 21. 
See, also, as to the distinction in the federal 
courts, Franz v. Buder, 8 Cir., 11 F. 2d 854, 856; 
Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 1 Cir., 
275 F. 513, 24 A.L.R. 156." 
In the case at bar the decree has been entered. It has 
not been shown that the decree in any way affects the 
rights of the principal stockliolder of appellant except 
as the action affects the appellant itself. It does not 
attempt to establish as against her that the plaintiffs 
or some of them have an easement over her land. She is 
still at liberty to raise that issue. 
The appellant cites three cases to show that one 
of the principal stockholders and the wife, of the presi-
dent and principal witness, J. B. Walker, was an indis-
pensable party. The first case cited is a Montana one 
entitled Campbell v. Flaunery et al., 79 Pae. 702, 32 Mont. 
119. Here the plaintiffs bought a farm which included a 
reclaimed creek bottom. The waters which formerly 
flowed in the creek were diverted across the land occu-
pied but not owned by defendants, over which the plain-
tiff claimed an easement for this purpose. It doesn't 
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appear from the court's opinion just why it considered 
that the land owner was an indispensable party. There 
is the mere bald statement to that effect. But in analyzing 
the case this fact becomes evident. We are dealing with 
the flow of water. Unless the water has a proper outlet 
it could do great damage by erosion or by being darned 
up until it broke its confines. Unless there was a right 
to have the flood waters continue down the diversion 
ditch great damage could result. Under these circum-
stances it is conceivable that the court might require the 
land owner as an indispensable party. But there are no 
such facts here. We are not dealing with water. There 
is no damming up of an element until great danger to the 
land owner is involved. No great damage to the land 
already being used for the storage of huge stock piles of 
sand and the pounding of mammoth trucks filled with 
great loads of sand, could result from permitting the 
passage of persons and vehicles to the Eudd house. In our 
case, there is no great danger of a sudden freshet throw-
ing a destructive force against the land. In fact there is 
no danger of any damage being done to the land over 
which passage has been had from 1910 on, and apparently 
from time immemorial. If the interests of the wife of the 
president of defendant and one of the principal stock-
holders of the defendant was not sufficiently represented 
in the case at bar, she can bring a separate action to 
deny to plaintiffs the right of way which has existed so 
long and which the lower court found to be one of neces-
sity. 
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But the portion of the Campbell decision quoted by 
appellant was mere dicta, as the court points out (in the 
next sentence to the one quoted by appellant) where it 
says: "The main 'point in this case . . . is the question 
whether or not the defendants are estopped by the con-
duct of defendant William Flaunery.. ." 
That this statement is mere dicta is also shown by 
the fact that the court had already disposed of the ques-
tion of an easement over the servient estate by pointing 
out that the defendant had disclaimed to hold by pres-
cription and that the grant claimed was under a statute 
which did not give an easement. So the statement quoted 
by appellant is just dicta and as such, is of doubtful au-
thority. 
The second case cited is no more assistance to the 
respondent. In Peryer v. Pennock, 115 Atl. 105, 95 Vt. 
313, 17 ALE 863 the action was for specific performance 
of an installment contract for the purchase of land and 
(see 95 Vt. 314) for damage for inability to convey a good 
right of way. Plaintiff sought to compel defendant to ac-
cept partial payments before the same were due and to 
execute a deed and accept a mortgage. The court held 
this could not be done and reversed the judgment for 
the plaintiff. However, since defendant was willing to 
convey upon such payments, etc., if other demands of 
plaintiff, outside of the contract, were ignored, there re-
mained the matter of plaintiff's claim for damages for 
inability of defendant to convey the contracted right-of-
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way. Defendant claimed the owner of the servient estate 
recognized the right-of-way. The court, in remanding the 
case, said the owner of the servient estate should be made 
a party "if the decree is to have effective force on all 
concerned. On a remand of this case, the court of chan-
cery should refuse to proceed to make a decree until 
Goodrich is made a party . . ." But the court does not 
discuss indispensable parties nor say that the owner of 
the servient estate was an indispensable party. In fact 
the court expressly hedges the statement that Goodrich 
should be made a party by adding, "if the decree is to 
have effective force on all concerned." The court obvious-
ly recognizes that he is not an indispensable party but 
merely a necessary party if he is to be bound by the de-
cree. But there is no requirement that he be bound if 
the parties to the litigation do not seek such action. 
Furthermore it could well be that the owner of the ser-
vient estate is an indispensable party. The plaintiff 
claimed that the owner of the servient estate denied the 
existence of a right-of-way while the defendant claimed 
the servient owner recognized the obligation. To really 
do justice to the parties, the owner of the servient estate 
was an essential and probably an indispensable party. 
The last case cited by appellant (Fox v. Paul, 148 
Atl. 809, 158 Md. 379, 68 ALE 520) adds nothing. As 
it says there, where it is sought to locate a way of neces-
sity the party over whose land such way is to be located 
must be a party. But in the case at bar it is not sought 
to bind the principal stockholder of appellant and wife of 
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of the president of appellant as to the right of way. We 
merely seek to have a roadway (called variously a road, 
a right-of-way, a means of access, and a means of in-
gress and egress) restored. No adjudication of the right 
of way between these plaintiffs and this stockholder, is 
sought. The evidence show s^ that this defendant corpo-
ration in utter disregard of the rights of the property 
owners, scouped out the road, cut the level of the plant 
pit floor beneath the level of the remaining road and 
by this means and by piling great quantities of sand and 
gravel and road aggragate across the pit floor, cut off 
the access to the property above. It is sought to have 
this interruption of access terminated and permit passage 
across the area over which the destroyed road ran. 
If we were seeking by this action to obtain a legal 
adjudication for all time that the plaintiffs or some of 
them had a right of way across these lands, obviously 
the owner of the land would be an indispensable party. 
But that is not this action. Here the plaintiffs seek to en-
join a nuisance which consists in poluting the air, emit-
ting irritating noises and lights and blocking a roadway 
and compensation for damage done thereby. There is no 
more reason for holding that the defendants' landlord 
is an indispensable party in the nuisance suit for ob-
structing the roadway than for poluting the air. 
Furthermore, in answer to the objection that the wife 
of the president of the defendant and one of the principal 
stockholders of the defendant, should have made a party 
and was indispensable in this cause, it is to be observed 
that the owner did not obstruct the right-of-way. There 
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is no complaint against her as there is against the de-
fendant. 
It is also evident that the fact that defendant is a 
lessee in possession of the property has nothing to do 
with the case. Defendant is not being sued as lessee. 
It could be in there as a rank trespasser and still be liable 
for any interference with our passage. 
Obviously the wife of the president of defendant 
and one of its principal stockholders, is not an indispen-
sable party and hence the appeal cannot be sustained 
on the ground of non joinder. 
The third point made by appellant is found on page 
58 of the brief. Extensive quotations are made from 
cases as to the trial of law questions in equitable actions 
and finally two Utah cases are referred to. In both of the 
latter, a trial by jury was sought before the submission 
of the cases (Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, Utah 
.._.._, 225 P. 2d 739, 743, referred to at the bottom of page 
66 of appellant's brief, and Norbeck v. Board of Directors 
etc., 37 P. 2d 339, 84 Utah 506. We have no quarrel with 
the law there set forth. It just has no application to the 
facts in this case. In the case at bar no demand for a 
jury was made before the trial, as required Eule 38 of the 
Utah Kules of Civil Procedure. Appellant admits that 
no demand was made (page 66 of brief) but says that 
it was excused because it would have been compelled to 
elect between its position that a way of necessity was not 
within the issues and consenting to the trial of that issue. 
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Disregarding, for the sake of the argument, all other 
answers, it is sufficient to say that when appellant ob-
jected to the trial of that issue and lost, then was the 
time that a demand for a jury should have been made. 
Rule 39 (b) provides in part : 
". . . but, notwithstanding the failure of a 
party to demand a jury in an action in w h^ich such 
a demand might have been made of right, the court 
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by 
jury on any or all issues/' 
If the trial by jury of this issue wTas as important before 
the appellant lost the case as it now seeks to make out, 
why didn't the appellant request a jury when its objec-
tion was overruled? The trial by jury was waived first 
in not demanding it before trial (Rule 38) and second 
in failing at any time throughout the five weeks of trial 
to move the court to submit that issue to a jury. Appel-
lant does not show the diligence required to obtain a jury 
by delaying until after an adverse decision to first talk 
of one. 
Nor is an excuse for the failure to demand a jury 
aided by the plea that appellant did not know that there 
was an issue concerning right of way. As pointed out 
above (see page 8 of this brief) in paragraph 6 
of the complaint (R. 2) it was alleged that the stock 
piling of the sand obstructed the roads and lanes and in 
paragraph 7 it was alleged that appellant "dug away the 
roads" and "blocked and made parts of plaintiffs' prop-
erty inaccessable by obstructing rights of way, paths, and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
other means of ingress and egress . . ." and, in para-
graph 8, obstructed "free use and access" and the prayer 
was "that defendant be required and ordered by the court 
to restore all rights of way, paths and other means of 
ingress and egress" All of the allegations were denied. 
Eight of passage by road or lane, public or private and 
by easement, through grant, prescription or necessity 
was clearly an issue. If appellant had then been as 
anxious then for a trial by jury as it is now, a demand 
could have been made. It did not choose to seek such 
a trial then as required by Rule 38b even though the issue 
so submitted to the jury could be limited as permitted 
by Rule 38c. Nor did appellant at any time during the 
trial request a jury. It raises this issue for the first time 
after an adverse decision and, we suspect, merely be-
cause of it. 
The fourth point (page 67 of appellant's brief) is 
that a proceeding for an injunction is not the proper 
means of trying title to real estate. To substantiate this 
point appellant quotes from several authorities to the 
effect where "the primary purpose of the suit was to 
establish an easement" "the right to injunctive relief 
could not come into existence until the easement had 
been established . . ." to requote a part of excerpt taken 
from the Valley Mortuary case (225 P 2d 750) found on 
pages 69 and 70 of appellant's brief. 
Again we have no quarrel with the law cited. It just 
has no application. The quotation is based upon the 
premise stated: ". . . that the primary purpose of the 
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suit was to establish an easement. . ." The primary pur-
pose of our action is not to establish an easement but to 
curb a nuisance. The complaint seeks to restrain the 
emitting of disturbing sounds and lights by the opera-
tion and repair of heavy equipment and the polution of 
the air by the operation of such equipment and by the 
building and maintaining of large stockpiles of sand? 
gravel etc., and the obstructing of the means of access 
to plaintiffs' property by the maintenance of the same 
stockpiles. The obstructing of the "rights of way" and 
the "means of ingress and egress" were merely incidental 
to and connected with the other nuisances committed at 
the same time and largely by the same means. The com-
plaint about the obstruction of the way was not the pri-
mary purpose of the action as required under Norback 
v. Board of Directors etc., 37 P. 2d 339, 84 Utah 506, it 
was merely an incidental point. More than nine-tenths 
of the entire testimony requiring five weeks of trial re-
lated to matters not involving the right of way. 
Appellant's fifth point w h^ich is argued beginning 
at page 71 of its brief relates to a way of necessity and 
the fact that as such it ceases when the need passes. 
We have no quarrel with the law but it has no applica-
tion. There was no evidence that the need for this access 
road had ceased to exist. And there was positive evi-
dence that the road was the only means of access (E. 
580, line 26; E. 581, line 8; E. 584, line 29). 
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It is respectfully submitted: 
1. That obstructions to a right-of-way is a nuis-
ance. 
2. That the complaint states a cause of action for 
nuisance. 
3. That in the complaint the plaintiffs claim an ob-
struction of a right of way. 
4. That no steps were taken by demurrer, motion, 
answer or interrogatories to require a more definite 
statement of the rights infringed. 
5. That at Pre-trial no issue of the right of access, 
was raised. 
6. That all objections to the trial of the issue of 
right of way was waived by the failure to object to in-
troduction of evidence on the point. 
7. That Mrs. Walker was not an indispensable 
party and her non-joinder was waived. 
8. That the defendant and appellant has failed to 
show any grounds for reversal and the decree below 
should be affirmed. 
Kespectfully submitted, 
IRWIN CLAWSON, 
Attorney for Respondents Rudds 
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